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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This article considers whether the directors of a parent corporation breach their fiduciary duty to the shareholders and the corporation when they fail to obtain information concerning the business affairs and activities of a foreign subsidiary or to investigate
fully the activities of a subsidiary, when those directors have in* Associate, Arnold & Porter. Roxanne Ward, a summer associate at Arnold &

Porter during 1978, assisted in the underlying research for this memorandum. In
addition, special acknowledgement to Myron P. Curzan, who supervised the
preparation of this memorandum, and to other attorneys at Arnold & Porter
who reviewed and commented on earlier drafts of this memorandum. Copyright
1979 by Arnold & Porter. All rights reserved.
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formation that the subsidiary may be violating United States law.
These issues were originally raised in connection with alleged violations of the Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations1 and United
States restrictions concerning sales to South Africa and Namibia
by the wholly owned foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations. In response to allegations that their subsidiaries have carried on business in contravention of some of these requirements,
several United States corporations have argued that foreign law
provisions preclude control over their subsidiaries' operations and
that certain business information regarding these entities is completely unavailable to parent corporations. Relying on assurances
often given by the subsidiary's management, parent corporations
have represented that their subsidiaries are in compliance with
United States law.
Concerned shareholders have asked whether the directors of
the parent corporation in execution of their fiduciary duties to
the the parent corporation and its shareholders, have a legally enforceable obligation to know what the foreign subsidiary is doing.
Furthermore, they have asked whether and to what extent the
board of directors has a duty to investigate concrete allegations
that its subsidiary may be operating in violation of United States
law.
1. After Rhodesia unilaterally declared itself an independent nation in 1965,
the United Nations Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions
prohibiting the sale of all goods other than humanitarian supplies to Rhodesia.

Pursuant to the authority vested in him by the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945, as amended, 22 U.S.C.A. § 287c(a) (Supp. 1978), President Johnson

issued Executive Order No. 11,419 in July 1968, which adopted the essential
language of the U.N. resolution banning trade with Rhodesia. See Exec. Order
No. 11,419, reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A. § 287c app. (1979), as amended by Exec.

Order No. 11,978, 3 C.F.R. § 110 (1978). The Office of Foreign Assets Control,

Department of the Treasury, has issued "Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations"
designed to implement that Executive Order. The Sanctions Regulations prohibit the following transactions, among others, by "person[s] subject to the juris-

diction of the United States," except as authorized by the Secretary of the
Treasury:
(3) Transfers of property which involve merchandise destined to
Southern Rhodesia or to or for the account of business national thereof;
(4) Other transfers of property to or on behalf of or for the benefit of
any person in Southern Rhodesia (including the authorities thereof) . . ;
(b) Any transaction for the purpose of which has the effect of evading
or avoiding any of the prohibitions set forth in paragraph (a) of this sec-

tion is prohibited.
The full text of the Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations is attached as Appendix A.
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DUTY OF DIRECTORS

Current law imposes on directors an obligation to both know
and investigate violations of United States law. In addition, it appears that directors' duties to know and to investigate extend to
situations in which domestic subsidiaries may have violated
United States law. For example, the principles outlined in this
article oblige a director of a corporation to take concrete action,
once the board has received specific and realistic allegations that
its subsidiary may be engaging in activities in violation of civil
rights laws, environmental protection laws, or occupational safety
laws.
The following points are developed throughout this article:
1. It may be argued that corporate directors have a duty to remain informed about significant corporate activities. This duty
necessarily implies a correlative obligation to obtain detailed information about the business activities of a foreign subsidiary.
2. The board of directors, having notice of circumstances which
would raise the suspicions of a prudent man, has a duty both to
investigate those circumstances and to take corrective action commensurate with the resulting findings.
3. A director should not be able to avoid fiduciary duties by taking the position that foreign law prevents the disclosure of information relating to to the activities of the subsidiary in question.
4. At common law, a director is personally liable only for losses
suffered by the corporation that result from neglect of board
duties.
5. At common law, shareholders may be able to obtain a
mandatory injunction to compel directors to undertake an investigation of the activities of subsidiaries. Courts, however, are reluctant to interfere with matters of internal management entrusted to
the discretion of the board of directors.
6. In regard to controlling the activities of subsidiaries operating
in countries such as South Africa, additional new federal statutes
and regulatory requirements should be imposed (a) restricting the
sales activities of these subsidiaries, (b) requiring United States
parent corporations to obtain and make available to the public full
reports on the activities of these subsidiaries, and (c) creating
rights of actions for shareholders when these obligations are not
met.
II. DISCUSSION OF CASE LAW
With the increasing complexity of modern corporate structure,
the nature of the duty that a director owes to a corporation and
its shareholders has changed over time. Today it is generally rec-
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ognized that directors may delegate responsibility for day-to-day
management decisions to appropriate corporate officers. To reflect the realities of modern corporate life, the Commission on
Uniform Laws revised the Model Business Corporation Act in
1974 to provide that "the business and affairs of a corporation
shall be managed under the direction of "a board of directors. "2
Delaware has adopted similar statutory language.3 Although a
board may delegate everyday management responsibilities, the
company's directors are not relieved of "ultimate managerial responsibility, '4 or of their duty to oversee the activities of
5
delegates.
In the discharge of his duty to direct the management of a corporation and supervise the activities of the board's delegates, a
director must exercise the same ordinary care and diligence a prudent man in similar circumstances would exercise.6 A director of a
parent corporation must exercise the same degree of prudence
with respect to the affairs of a wholly owned subsidiary as to the
affairs of the parent. The leading case of General Rubber Co. v.
Benedict 7 affirmed this principle. Judge Cardozo upheld the right
of a corporation to sue its directors for failure to inform the corporation that the manager of a wholly owned subsidiary was embezzling money from the subsidiary. The value of the subsidiary's
shares held by the parent corporation plummeted as a result of
the embezzlement. Analogizing the duty of a director of a parent
to that of a trustee, Judge Cardozo reasoned:
2. The italicized language was added by the 1974 revision to the Model Bus.
Corp. Act Ann. § 35, para. 1 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.) (emphasis added).
3. See Del. Code Ann., Subch. IV, § 141(a) (1976).
4. See, e.g., University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d
518, 532 (5th Cir. 1974).
5.

"A corporate director ...

may delegate his investment responsibility to

fellow directors, corporate officers, or even outsiders, but he must continue to
exercise general supervision over the activities of his delegates." Stern v. Lucy
Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F.
Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974); see also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 165
(1891) (directors "are entitled under the law to commit the banking business, as
defined, to their duly-authorized officers, but this does not absolve them from
the duty of reasonable supervision. ..

.")

6. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. at 152; Harman v. Willbern, 374 F.
Supp. 1149, 1161 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963); Neese v.
Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 694, 405 S.W.2d 577, 581 (1964).
7. 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96, 174 N.Y.S. 7 (1915).
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Here the stockholder is not suing the agent of another company; it
is suing its own agent. The stockholder happens to be itself a corporation; the defendant happens to be a director; but the legal
problem would be the same if the plaintiff were a natural person,
and the defendant an executor or trustee. . .. If the trustee of an
estate, holding shares in a bank, should learn that the cashier was
looting it, and with that knowledge should keep silent, the defendant would have us say that the beneficiaries under the will would
have no remedy for the ensuing loss. . . . Yet his duty to preserve
the estate, the breach of that duty, and the resulting damage,
would seem to call for the application of the principle that there is
no wrong without a remedy. The case supposed does not differ in
its essence from the case presented.
The defendant, as a director of a corporation, should have taken
the same care of its property that men of average prudence take of
their own property."
Clearly directors of the parent have certain fiduciary obligations with respect to minority shareholders of the subsidiary."
While directors of a parent corporation owe fiduciary duties to
minority shareholders of the subsidiary, those directors also owe

their own shareholders fiduciary duties with respect to the management of the affairs of the subsidiary. Indeed, the fiduciary duties of a parent corporation to its shareholders may limit the duty
of a parent to its subsidiary.1 0 The common thread that runs
through the relevant case law is that a corporation owning a controlling interest in another corporation is not merely another
shareholder. The directors of the controlling corporation have

fidiciary obligations to minority shareholders of the subsidiary.
Most importantly, however, the directors have fiduciary obligations to their own shareholders which may not be avoided because
of the parent corporation's status as a shareholder of the
subsidiary.

8. Id. at 22, 109 N.E. at 97, 174 N.Y.S. at 8. See also Piccard v. Sperry Corp.,
30 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), where the court held that a shareholder of the
parent could maintain a derivative suit against the directors of the parent for
breach of duty in connection with a sale by the subsidiary of stock owned by the
parent.
9. E.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). See also 13
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5766, 5811
(rev. perm. ed. 1970 & 1978 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
10. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 888 (Del. 1970)
(holding that a parent corporation need not share its oil import quotas with its
subsidiary).
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A. Duty to Remain Informed of CorporateAffairs
Several jurisdictions have held that a prudent director is
obliged to remain informed about corporate affairs. As one court
has stated,
It is the obvious duty of directors to know what is transpiring in
the business affairs of their corporation. They cannot assume the
responsibilities of their fiduciary position, then simply close their
eyes to what is going on around them and thereby avoid the consequences by the mere failure to act. While corporate directors are
not liable for errors of judgment, nevertheless, the law holds them
accountable for that which they reasonably should have known or
discovered in the discharge of their duties . . . . Mere passivity
and disavowal of knowledge alone do not and should not constitute
a pass to freedom from responsibility . .

..

A director's duty to be knowledgeable about the corporation's
practices was emphasized in a special report recently issued by
the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with an
investigation of the fraudulent activities of a large modular home
building corporation. 12 The SEC filed a complaint against Stirling Homex charging that the corporation had issued materially false
registration statements, press releases, and periodic reports to the
Commission. On the basis of information obtained from its official
11. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd mem., 258
N.Y.S.2d 629 (App. Div. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y.
1966) (citations omitted). Accord, Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888 (6th
Cir. 1938) ("directors should retain and maintain a reasonable control and supervision over the affairs of the Bank, especially its larger and more important
ones, to the end that they may keep themselves informed of its condition");
McGinnis v. Corp. Funding & Finance Co., 8 F.2d 532, 538 (M.D. Pa. 1925) (" 'it
is the duty of directors to acquaint themselves with the affairs of the company
so far as it is possible to do so, to learn of its methods, to be diligent, to know of
its condition. . .

.'"

(quoting the special master's report summarizing the law);

Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (director has a duty to keep
himself informed in some detail of the corporation's affairs and conduct of business); Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 534-35, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550, 563 (Sup.
Ct. 1938) (directors "'should know of and give direction to the general affairs of
the institution and its business policy, and have a general knowledge of the

manner in which the business is conducted, the character of the investments and

the employment of the resources' ") (quoting Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth
Trust Co. of New York, 223 N.Y. 103, 106, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (N.Y. 1918)).
12. "Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation
Relating to Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation,"
[1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) %80,219 (July 16, 1975).
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investigation of the corporation's alleged fraudulent activities, the
SEC issued a special public report commenting on the two
outside directors with considerable business experience who failed
to take the time to understand the corporation's accounting practices or to question management practices and decisions. After
noting that it was the Commission's view that these directors had
performed inadequately in protecting the interests of shareholders, the Commission concluded:
There existed no internal system by which they [the outside directors] were regularly provided with significant information concerning corporate affairs and to some extent the [sic] recognized
this deficiency. For example, Kheel and Castellucci [the outside directors] were not normally provided with financial projections, corporate development plans or the status of corporate contracts and
agreements. In the Commission's opinion, they did not obtain a
sufficiently firm grasp of the company's accounting practices and
other aspects of the company's business related thereto to enable
them to make an informed judgment of its more important affairs
or the abilities and integrity of its officers. Kheel and Castellucci
relied upon the fact that Stirling Homex's independent accountants had accepted these accounting practices as being in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. While this reliance was understandable, it resulted in their making no significant
effort to analyze or familiarize themselves generally with these accounting practices, and in the opinion of the Commission, it resulted in their failure to understand the implications of these accounting practices and their susceptibility to abuse. While they
periodically asked general and conclusory questions, they frequently obtained only superficial answers which they accepted
without further inquiry.' 3

The SEC condemned similar conduct by corporate directors in
a recent report concerning the obligations of outside directors to
inform shareholders about the basic operations of a company.14
According to the report, the outside directors permitted the company to issue favorable reports and press releases which omitted
information about the company's impaired financial condition.
The directors also "did nothing effective to ensure that they be
13. Id. at 11 85,462-63.
14. "Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc.,
Relating to Activities of the Outside Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc.,"
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 81,410 (Jan. 16, 1978).
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provided accurate, current information." 15 In response to the directors' assertion that they relied in good faith on management
and company counsel's advice concerning the need for disclosure,
the Commission stated: "[D]irectors have a responsibility affirmatively to keep themselves informed of developments within the
company and to seek out the nature of corporate disclosures to
determine if adequate disclosures are being made."1
A failure by outside directors to control and to supervise adequately the company's officers and managers was the basis for injunctive relief in SEC v. Shiell.17 According to a description of
the complaint,1 8 the SEC alleged that the directors relied solely
on information supplied by the chief officer of the company and
failed to request other information relating to that part of the
business that had generated increased earnings.1 9 The complaint
further alleged that the directors did not question the accuracy of
the information they received from the chief officer, nor did they
seek information from other officers of the company. 20 As reported by CCH, the court stated that all but two of the former
officers and directors consented to a permanent injunction.2 1 The
two remaining defendants, whose position the court did not identify, were unsuccessful in having the complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 22 The complaint in Shiell and the statements in recent SEC reports support
the conclusion that a director has an obligation to obtain information about significant corporate matters, particularly when
that information is not forthcoming from management.
B.

Duty to Investigate When Put on Notice of Potential
Wrongdoing

In determining whether a director has performed prudently,
courts have consistently recognized that a director is on notice of

15. Id. at 88,880.
16. Id.
17. [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 (N.D. Fla.
1977).
18. See generally 383 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-8-11 (Dec. 22, 1976).
19. Id. at A-10.
20. Id.
21. SEC v. Shiell, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at
92,384.
22. Id. at 92,387.
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facts sufficient to raise the suspicisons of a prudent man who has
a clear duty to take corrective action appropriate to the circumthis principle in the
stances. The Supreme Court acknowledged
23
leading case of Briggs v. Spaulding:
If nothing has come to [the directors'] knowledge, to awaken suspicion of the fidelity of the president and cashier, ordinary attention
to the affairs of the institution is sufficient. If [the directors] become acquainted with any fact calculated to put prudent men on
their guard, a degree of care commensurate with the evil to be
avoided is required, and a want of that care certainly makes them
responsible.24
In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 25 the court set forth the

standard of care required of directors as follows:
[I]t appears that directors are entitled to rely on the honesty and
integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them
on suspicion that something is wrong. If such occurs and goes unheeded, then liability of the directors might well follow, but absent
cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install
and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists ....
If he has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his
duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee
wrongdoing, the law will
26
cast the burden of liability upon him.
The shareholders in this case brought suit alleging that the company's directors had a duty to take action to learn of the antitrust

violations of its employees. The director-defendants were found
not liable because they established that as soon as they had

"grounds for suspicion [of antitrust activity], the Board acted

' 27
promptly to end it and prevent its recurrence.
In DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Company,28 a

case involving the "looting" of a corporation after sale of control,
the court upheld a jury verdict imposing liability on a former director who failed to keep informed of certain corporate affairs
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

141 U.S. 132 (1891).
Id. at 148.
41 Del. Ch.78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
Id. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130.
Id.
374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967).
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and to investigate whether the sale of control was in the best interest of the corporation.29 The court determined that there was
sufficient evidence to support the lower court's conclusion that
the director should have (1) remained on the board, (2) actively
opposed the plan for sale of control, and (3) if necessary, brought
the matter to the attention of the shareholders and state regulatory officials.30 The court held that the director in DePinto was
given sufficient warning signals that the transaction merited further investigation.3 1
A similar situation arose in Prudential Trust Company v.
Brown,32 in which bank directors were held negligent for failure
to take effective action to correct mismanagement practices
brought to their attention by a bank commissioner's report. 3 The
court held that in light of specific mismanagement allegations, the
bank directors were not justified to rely on assurances by bank
officers that the claims were groundless. It stated further that:
The conditions reported by the Bank Commissioner should have
put [the directors] upon inquiry as to the true state of affairs, and
makes them chargeable with the knowledge which such inquiry
would have disclosed. The statements of condition submitted to
them by their officers, in the absence of information to the contrary, could have been relied upon by them and acted upon without negligence, but with information at hand from an independent
and impartial source that things were not as.they appeared on the
surface, this to my mind charged them with the duty of further
inquiry and investigation, and reliance upon the officers under
3
those circumstances was not sufficient. 4
The court charged the directors with knowledge of the contents of
the commissioner's report as well as with knowledge of facts
which would have been gained from a comlete investigation.
An affirmative obligation to take corrective action was also recognized in Walker v. Man,35 in which the court stated,
29. Id. at 44.
30. The court emphasized the following facts: the target company itself was
in a deficit condition; the plan to transfer was executed in a hasty manner; the
director was aware of complaints about the target company's management; and

the director was not told the details of the transaction. Id. at 43.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 43-44.
271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930).
Id. at 151, 171 N.E. at 50.
Id., 171 N.E. at 50 (quoting the findings of the master).
142 Misc. 277, 253 N.Y.S. 458 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
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As directors, these defendants were not only obligated to do nothing wrongful themselves, but to attempt to prevent wrongdoing by
their fellow directors, and, if wrong be committed, to seek to rectify it. Passivity and disavowal of knowledge alone do not constitute a pass to freedom from responsibility. A director may not shut
off liability by shutting off his hearing and sight. It is his duty to
know what is transpiring. The company's stockholders and creditors, as well as the public, have a right to rely upon the performance by him of the duties of a director. 6
The foregoing cases suggest that if a director has knowledge of
specific allegations that his company may be violating U.S. law, it
is incumbent upon that director to take some affirmative action to
investigate those allegations. What the cases do not make clear,
however, is whether the prudent director must investigate claims
himself or whether he may rely on management's efforts to review
the corporation's compliance with United States law. Arguably, a
director may rely in good faith on the business records of the corporation and reports of corporate officers as long as there is no
indication that the officers are untrustworthy or the corporate
records and reports are inaccurate.37 Nevertheless, the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Report on the Stirling Homex directors clearly suggests that a director may not rely on "self-serving"
reassurances from management or refuse to scrutinize corporate
affairs.-" In short, perfunctory and general answers by management will not suffice; nor will an exculpatory report by a corporate officer involved in the conduct under investigation.3 9
Where directors are faced with specific charges that a subsidiary is violating United States law, can a prudent director simply
rely on management to ferret out the facts? The Graham case
suggests that a prudent director may rely on management as long
36. Id. at 278-79, 253 N.Y.S. at 462. See also Platt Corp. v. Platt, 249
N.Y.S.2d at 5-7.
37. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555-56 (1964);
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130; Model
Bus. Corp. Act. Ann., § 35, para. 1, 1 2.
38. See generally Stirling Homex, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) T 80,219 at 1 85,461, 85,462-63.
39. In several cases involving the judgment of a board of directors not to
pursue claims seeking recovery from the board, courts have required that the
board's decision not to sue must have been made by independent directors who
did not participate in or approve the transactions on which the claims are based.
See Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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as there is no indication that management might have participated in, or had knowledge of, the alleged conduct or that it
would not conduct a thorough, good-faith investigation of the alleged conduct.4 However, if a director has or should have had
reason to believe that something less than a complete and objective report would be provided, he must take steps to obtain adequate information." If further steps are not taken, it would seem
that a director's decision, based on a report which he knew or
should have known was incomplete, would be tainted with the
bias and bad faith of the report.
Closely related to the issue of the directors' good-faith reliance
on reports issued by internal management is the question of
whether a decision based on these reports would be insulated
from judicial review by the "sound business judgment" rule. The
rule provides that absent allegations of directors' bad faith or
misconduct, courts should refrain from interfering in directors'
decisions relating to the internal management of a corporation. 2
It has generally been applied to deny standing to shareholders
asserting derivative claims based on issues relating to internal
corporate affairs. However, this author submits that where the directors' decision may result in continuation of illegal activity, the
business judgment rule no longer affords protection to the board.
In several cases involving allegations of illegality, courts have
not invoked the business judgment rule to protect the directors.
For example, in Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Company,43 the business judgment rule did not bar suit by the
shareholders of AT&T who alleged that the directors' decision
not to collect a debt owed to the corporation violated the federal
campaign contribution laws and thereby resulted in a breach of
fiduciary duty. In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the

40. 41 Del. Ch. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130.
41. Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d at 889-91 (directors of bank held negligent
for not maintaining a system of supervision that would have alerted the directors to the president's omission of material information from reports read to the
board); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. at 0 (directors, who had been
informed of possible mismanagement practices by officers, held negligent in relying on statements of officers and in not investigating the charges further). (For a
brief discussion of Prudential,see text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.)
42. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,
263-64 (1917); Ash v. Int'l Business Machines, Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 492-93 (3d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); 5 FLETCHER, supra note 9 at § 2104.
43. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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shareholders' suit, the court stated that "even though committed
to benefit the corporation, illegal acts may amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty in New York.""" Citing Abrams v. Allen, it confrom engaging in activicluded that "directors must be restrained
4' 5
ties which are against public policy.

In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,4" the Supreme
Court affirmed the right of shareholders to bring a derivative action alleging that the directors had entered into an illegal transaction. Charging that TVA had acted beyond its statutory powers,
the shareholders challenged a contract between their corporation
and TVA "as injurious to the interests of the corporation and as
an illegal transaction.

' 47

Recognizing the right of the shareholders

to bring a derivative action under such circumstances, Chief Justice Hughes stated in an opinion joined by three other Justices:
In such a case it is not necessary for stockholders-when their
corporation refused to take suitable measures for its protection-to show that the managing board or trustees have acted
with fraudulent intent or under legal duress. To entitle the
complainants to equitable relief, in the absence of an adequate legal remedy, it is enough for them to show the breach
of trust or duty involved in the injurious and illegal action.
Nor is it necessary to show that the transaction was ultra
vires of the corporation. The illegality may be found in the
lack of lawful authority on the part of those with whom the
corporation is attempting to deal. Thus, the breach of duty
may consist in yielding, without appropriate resistance, to
governmental demands which are without warrant of law or
are in violation of constitutional restrictions .... The fact

that the directors in the exercise of their judgment, either because they were disinclined to undertake a burdensome litigation or for other reasons which they regarded as substantial,
resolved to comply with the legislative or administrative demands, has not been deemed an adequate ground for denying
to the stockholders an opportunity to contest the validity of
requirements to which the directors were
the governmental
48
submitting.

44. Id. at 762 (interpretingRoth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct.
1909), and Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1947)).
45.

Id.

46. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
47. Id. at 318-19.
48. Id. at 319-20.
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In Gall v. Exxon Corp.49 a case subsequent to Ashwander, the
court rejected an argument that shareholders may challenge a decision not to pursue a claim involving past corporate conduct.
The court pointed out that Exxon had discontinued the conduct
in question and that the directors' decision was "not itself a violation of law and does not result in the continuationof the alleged
violation.0 Unlike the situation in Gall, a director's decision not
to investigate allegations of illegal activity by subsidiaries would
result in the continuation of that illegal activity. Just as the
shareholders in Miller and Ashwander were able to challenge decisions of the boards of directors that might have resulted in unlawful action, shareholders of United States corporations should
be permitted to challenge a board's decision effectively allowing a
subsidiary to continue violating United States statutory or regulatory requirements.
C. Duty to Investigate in the Context of Foreign Secrecy
Laws
Another complex question that must be addressed is whether
corporate officials should be exonerated where foreign law allegedly prohibits disclosure of information enabling them to determine whether a subsidiary is violating United States law. This
issue is particularly important where foreign subsidiaries are located in South Africa or Rhodesia.
The leading Supreme Court case on the impact of foreign disclosure laws on United States legal obligations is Socit Internationale v. Rogers.5 1 In that case, a Swiss holding corporation, Interhandel, sought to recover United States assets seized pursuant
to the Trading with the Enemy Act.2 Swiss banking secrecy laws
prohibited Interhandel from complying with lower court orders to
produce documents subpoenaed by the United States government.5 3 After reviewing the policy underlying enactment of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, the Court reaffirmed the authority
of the lower court to require Interhandel to obtain release of the
records from the Swiss authorities:

49.

418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

50.

Id. at 518 (emphasis added).

51.
52.
53.

357 U.S. 197 (1958).
50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq. (1976).
357 U.S. at 205.
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[T]o hold broadly that petitioner's failure to produce the ...
records because of fear of punishment under the laws of its sovereign precludes a court from finding that petitioner had "control"
over them, and thereby from ordering their production, would undermine congressional policies made explicit in the 1941 amendments, and invite efforts to place ownership of American assets in
persons or firms whose sovereign assures secrecy of records. 4
The Court, however, refused on due process grounds to dismiss
Interhandel's suit, noting that the evidence showed the corporation's "extensive efforts at compliance" and the "fear of criminal
prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse . . . not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign." 5 5 The Court also emphasized that Interhandel claimed no
immunity from United States law, only "its inability to comply
because of foreign law.""8 In remanding the case, the Court allowed the district court considerable discretion to explore alternative methods of compliance and to draw adverse inferences from
the fact of the missing documents:
It may be that in a trial on the merits, petitioner's inability to produce specific information will prove a serious handicap in dispelling doubt the Government might be able to inject into the case. It
may be that in the absence of complete disclosure by petitioner,
the District Court would be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular events. So much indeed petitioner concedes. But these problems go to the adequacy of petipreclude petitioner
tioner's proof and should not on this record
57
from being able to contest on the merits.
In sum, the Court's decision struck the following compromise:

while Interhandel was allowed to proceed with its suit, the district court also had the right to draw adverse inferences as a result of Interhandel's inability to produce records because of Swiss
law.
Later courts presented with similar questions concerning the

effect of foreign disclosure laws on the production of documents
have uniformly required a showing of good-faith effort to produce
the documents.58 If a party who is claiming inability to produce
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 212-13 (emphasis in original).
Id.
See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,
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documents because of foreign secrecy laws acts in bad faith, a
court may properly impose monetary sanctions for noncompliance
with court-ordered discovery."
Apart from the question of good-faith efforts to comply with
discovery orders, post-Socit Internationale cases do not agree
on whether a court may order the production of documents held
in a foreign country if such production would require conduct violating the laws of that country. Several cases have suggested that
a court has no power to issue a decree mandating violations of
foreign law.60
Criticizing these cases, the Tenth Circuit in Arthur Andersen &
Co. v. Finesilver,6 ' distinguished between the power to impose
sanctions for noncompliance with a court order and the power to
issue an order compelling discovery.6 2 The court commented as
follows on SociWt Internationale:
Soci~tg does not say that a discovery order mandating violation of
foreign law is invalid. It only indicates that the foreign law question goes to the imposition of a sanction for noncompliance with
local law ....
An anomalous situation with great potential effect would result
from recognition of the right of a litigant to avoid discovery permitted by local law through the assertion of violation of foreign
law. Foreign law may not control local law. It cannot invalidate an
order which local law authorizes. 3
The Finesilver court appears to uphold the validity of a discovery
order irrespective of whether compliance would result in violation
of foreign law. Foreign law restrictions should be considered only
where a court is considering holding a party in contempt for failure to produce documents allegedly protected from disclosure by
foreign law.6 In this author's judgment, the Firiesilverapproach
563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d
611 (2d Cir. 1962).
59. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1373-76 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 114 (1978).
60. See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613; Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS,
271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
61. 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
62. Id. at 341.
63. Id. at 342.
64. It is interesting to note that the same court which decided Finesilver
subsequently held that good-faith efforts at compliance prevent the imposition
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seems correct since the Supreme Court in Interhandel expressly
affirmed the right of the lower court to issue the discovery
order.6 5
The court in Finesilver relied in part on principles set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. Section 39 of the Restatement expressly provides that a
state with jurisdiction to enforce a rule of law is not prevented
from exercising that enforcement power simply because resulting
conduct might subject a person to liability under the laws of a
foreign state. 6 In an effort to avoid the conflict that would inevitably result if every state disregarded the legal and policy formulations of other sovereigns, however, the Restatement § 40 stipulates that the following factors should be considered prior to
exercise of enforcement powers:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule
67
prescribed by that state.
Although the Restatement recognizes that a state may exercise its
enforcement authority in such a way that it creates conflicting legal obligations for a person, the commentary on this section explains that a court should avoid enforcing an order which would

of sanctions for noncompliance resulting from the operation of foreign law. In re
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d at 998-99.
65. 357 U.S. at 205.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 39 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. See also In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Litigation, 563 F.2d at 997; United States v. Im-

perial Chemical Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 228-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In Imperial
Chemical the court, having determined that the defendant had engaged in an
unlawful conspiracy to divide territories by means of worldwide exclusive patenting arrangements, ordered the co-conspirators in effect to violate British patent law and public policy. The court recognized that its order might not be enforced by British courts, as indeed it was not. Id. at 229-30. See Note,
Limitations on the Federal JudicialPower to Compel Acts Violating Foreign
Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1441, 1443-45 (1963).
67. RESTATEMENT, supra note 66 at § 40.
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require violation of foreign law."

The reasoning in Socit6 Internationale,Finesilver, and the
Restatement leads one to conclude that a court may issue an order compelling discovery even where the effect of that order may
be to cause a violation of foreign law. In an action to impose sanctions for noncompliance with the court order, however, the court
must adopt a balanciipg approach, weighing the defendant's goodfaith efforts to comply against the competing interests of the
plaintiff and the sovereign states involved.
In light of the case law examined thus far, the author submits
that where directors of a parent corporation have knowledge or
reason to know that its subsidiary is operating in violation of
United States law, a defense based on foreign law will probably
not prevail. First, it is clear that a court could properly order a
United States corporation to produce documents relating to the
activities of its foreign subsidiaries even though it alleges that foreign law prohibits disclosure. Moreover, even where obligations
imposed by United States courts are inconsistent with foreign
law, enforcement of the order may be appropriate in some cases.
Second, it should be noted that this author is describing the liabilities of United States corporations, whose directors are in most
cases United States citizens with fiduciary obligations to United
States shareholders. These fiduciary obligations are governed by
long-established principles of statutory and common law. In light
of shareholders' substantial interest in requiring directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties and in light of express United States
policies which prohibit corporations subject to its jurisdiction
from engaging in certain types of foriegn trade operations, directors of United States corporations should not be exonerated on
grounds that foreign disclosure laws prohibit them from investigating the activities of their subsidiaries. To hold otherwise would
allow circumvention of United States law and encourage domestic
corporations to locate foreign subsidiaries in countries which
clothe corporate activities in a shroud of secrecy. Such precedents
68. See id. §§ 39, 40, Comment a. There is an analogous principle in the
antitrust field that "corporate conduct which is compelled by a foreign sovereign
is ... protected from antitrust liability, as if it were an act of the state itself."
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th
Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center,
Inc., [1963] TRADE CAS. %70,600, at 77,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified,
[1965] TRADE CAS. %70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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would undermine the regulatory framework in which domestic
corporations are currently required to operate.6 9
Assuming that directors or management could successfully raise
the defense of foreign disclosure laws,70 at the very least a court
should be allowed to draw adverse inferences from the directors'
inability to obtain information relating to the affairs of a subsidiary. This "choice of evils" approach derives from the Court's theory in SociWt Internationale in which the plaintiff was allowed

to Pursue its claim, but the district court was allowed to draw
"unfavorable inferences" from the lack of evidence. 7 '

69. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to authority granted to it by Section 13 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976), has promulgated regulations imposing extensive periodic reporting requirements on corporations having registered securities. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 - 13e-1 (1978). The purpose of such periodic reports is to
insure "proper protection of investors and ...

fair dealing in the security." 15

U.S.C. § 78m (1976). The omission of material facts from periodic reports required to be filed with the Commission may, in certain circumstances, create
liability for the corporation and certain other persons who may have filed, prepared, or signed the mandatory reports. See, e.g., Section 18 of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78r (1976). The United States investor would stand substantial risk of
losing the protection afforded by such disclosure requirements if corporate management or directors were allowed to evade liability for the omission of material
facts by asserting that foreign laws prevented disclosure. See generally Comment, Control of Multinational Corporations'Foreign Activities, 15 WASHBURN
L.J. 435 (1976).
70. Of course, before the directors could successfully invoke a foreign law
defense, the directors would have to meet the requirements set forth in the cases
discussed above in the text, namely, proof of good-faith efforts to obtain a
waiver of foreign disclosure laws and to explore alternative means of securing
the information without running afoul of foreign laws and proof that there is
indeed a conflict presented under foreign law. See text accompanying notes 6070 supra.
71. 357 U.S. at 212-13. This approach also resembles an interesting theory
suggested by an article discussing ways in which the United States could require
multinational enterprises to order South African subsidiaries to implement nondiscriminatory racial policies. See Dehner, MultinationalEnterpriseand Racial
Non-Discrimination: United States Enforcement of an InternationalHuman
Right, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (1974). The article proposed that the United
States levy fines on multinational enterprises (MNE's) that have subsidiaries
practicing discrimination pursuant to South African law. As Dehner notes, such
provisions of U.S. law should not simply be viewed as conflict-oriented and
aimed at creating inconsistent legal obligations. Rather, they should be perceived as imposing reasonable conditions on doing business in South Africa:
While an MNE would technically be caught in a legal squeeze as to operations in a country which required a racially discriminatory employment
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D. Relief Available to Shareholders
The cause of action normally asserted by shareholders in a derivative suit involving possible violations of United States law by
a foreign subsidiary is based on directors' negligence 'n the discharge of their duties to the corporation. Shareholders may seek
other damages from the directors or a court order requiring them
to supervise and investigate the business affairs of the subsidiary.
Case law indicates that, absent allegations of personal profit,
directors are personally liable only for losses that result from the
negligent performance of their duties. 2 Unless evidence that the
corporation suffered actual loss as a result of the directors' negligence is presented, it appears that damages will not be awarded.
If a penalty is assessed against the corporation for violation of
United States law and it is shown that the illegal activity in question was proximately caused by the directors' negligence, however, the penalty should be recoverable from the directors.7 3
policy, the United States penalty would constitute an appropriate disincentive for operating in such an environment and practicing discrimination therein. By viewing such a penalty as a condition placed by the
United States on an MNE's establishing operations in countries which require racially discriminatory employment policies, it is evident that no due
process problem would arise from the existence of superficially conflicting
legal obligations. The issue is not whether an MNE is forced to comply
with two conflicting standards, but whether the United States may penalize an MNE for implementing certain policies which derive from a foreign
legal obligation.
Id. at 105 (footnotes omitted). The court in First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271
F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960), explained that if a
corporation "cannot .

.

. comply with the lawful requirements both of the

United States and of [South Africa], perhaps it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom." Id. at 620.
72. Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 673 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 772
(1944) (a director "is liable only for loss that results from his negligence");
Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 419 (2d Cir. 1943); Jersawit v. Kaltenbach,
256 A.D. 580, 581, 10 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (App. Div.), aff'd, 24 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y.
1939) (a director "should not be required to account merely upon proof that he
was negligent in the supervision of its affairs ... without proof that the negligence has resulted in some loss or injury to the corporation"); 3 FLETCHER, supra
note 9, at § 992; 3A id., at § 1087.1.
73. For example, the Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations specify that pursuant
to the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1976), any person who
"willfully violates or evades or attempts to violate or evade" any provisions of
the Sanctions is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000. See 31 C.F.R. §
530.701 (1978). See also 3A FLETCHER, supra note 9, at §§ 1087, 1179.
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In some cases, shareholders have been allowed equitable relief
although the corporation suffered no loss. One plaintiff-shareholder obtained an injunction against the unlawful acts of a corporation even though these acts did not result in any loss to the
corporation. 4 As one commentator has noted, a court of equity
has jurisdiction to enjoin illegal or ultra vires acts at the suit of a
stockholder even when there is no loss to the corporation. 5
In order to compel the board of directors to investigate the affairs of a subsidiary, shareholders must seek affirmative relief in
the form of a mandatory injunction. Generally, courts have refused to issue injunctions that interfere with the internal affairs
of a corporation, since management of the corporation is entrusted to the board of directors.76 This policy of noninterference
is another manifestation of the business judgment rule. 7 For the
same reasons that the business judgment rule does not bar initiation of a derivative action, however, the noninterference rule
probably does not prevent issuance of a mandatory injunction
where directors of the parent corporation have knowledge or notice of its subsidiary's illegal activity. As Fletcher has noted in his
authoritative treatise on corporate law,
[C]ourts of equity will not hesitate to grant relief to protect the
property of the corporation and the rights of stockholders where
the corporate powers are being illegally or unconscientiously executed. Equity will restrain acts authorized by the directors in violation of the agreement under which the corporation was organized,
and it will restrain the commission of acts which are contrary to
law and tend to the destruction of the franchises as well as the
improper management of7 the
business of the company or a wrong8
ful diversion of its funds.
Courts have allowed shareholders' suits seeking injunctive relief
74. Whitehead v. Farmers' Fire & Lightning Mut. Ins. Co., 227 Mo. App.
891, 900, 60 S.W.2d 65, 70 (1933) (shareholder entitled to injunctive relief
against conduct of unlawful business which the evidence showed was profitable
to the corporation).
75. 13 FLETCHER, supra note 9, at § 5823. See also Runcie v. Bankers Trust
Co., 6 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (the court rejected the defense that the
illegal corporate action complained of resulted in no loss and actually benefitted
the corporation).

76.

10

FLETCHER,

supra note 9, at § 4860.

77. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see text accompanying
note 44 supra.

78.

10

FLETCHER,

supra note 9, at § 4860.

22

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13.1

against directors who decided not to pursue a claim against themselves.7 ' The Supreme Court has indicated that where shareholders allege that a transaction is illegal and injurious to the corporation, they are entitled to equitable relief: "[W]hen their
corporation refuses to take suitable measures for its protection
• . .it is enough to show the breach of trust or duty involved in

the injurious and illegal action."80 Equitable relief is particularly
appropriate in cases where there are no other remedies for breach
of fiduciary duties, i.e., where a United States subsidiary might
continue to participate in activity illegal under United States law.
To ensure that shareholders have a right not only to require the
directors to take reasonable steps in compliance with United
States law but also to recover damages from the directors for penalties assessed against the corporation because of the foreign subsidiary's activities, the author recommends enactment of a new
federal statute that expressly provides for derivative suits. Such a
statute should require United States corporations to submit to
the government information relating to certain subsidiary activities and impose penalties for a failure to submit the required
data. The statute should also contain provisions authorizing
shareholders: (1) to seek affirmative relief where necessary to ensure that the required corporate investigations and reports are
made; and (2) to bring an action, in the name of the corporation,
to recover damages from the directors for reckless or intentional
failures to comply with the reporting requirements of the statute
and to recover penalties assessed against the corporation. In addition, a provision authorizing shareholder remedies should create a
private right of action in the name of the corporation against directors who recklessly or intentionally make or cause to be made
any false or misleading statements regarding subsidiary activities
to the United States government."'
79. See Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973, 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

80. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 319 (1936).
81.

A discussion of the measure of damages available in a derivative action

under this provision of the proposed statute is not within the scope of this article. However, several considerations that bear on the availability of relief should

be noted. Just as the directors' breach of duty must have caused a loss to the
corporation in order for shareholders to recover for mismanagement in a deriva-

tive suit (see text accompanying notes 74-75 supra), a prerequisite to recovery
under the proposed statute should be that the false and misleading statements

made or caused to be made by the director resulted in a loss to the corporation.
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Parent corporations are best able to discover whether their foreign subsidiaries are acting contrary to United States law, thereby
undermining its policy objectives. Shareholders concerned about
their corporation's compliance with United States law may currently be inhibited by the "business judgment rule;" consequently, their ability to force directors to perform their fiduciary
duties to the corporation and determine what these subsidiaries
are doing is negligible. While there are strong arguments against
application of the business judgment rule under the circumstances described in this article, a statute such as the one proposed would resolve doubt in favor of the shareholders and give
effect to United States foreign policy objectives manifested in foreign trade restrictions.
III.

CONCLUSION

Although numerous cases contain general language supporting
the theory that boards of directors have a duty to remain informed only about significant corporate matters, it appears that a
stronger argument can be made establishing an overriding duty to
investigate where they have notice of circumstances that would
raise the suspicions of reasonably prudent men. The extent to
which a board of directors must undertake an investigation independent of corporate management rather than rely upon reviews
made in the ordinary course of business is not clear. Despite this
lack of clarity, however, a strong argument can be made that directors should not be able to rely simply on general assurances
from management that a foreign subsidiary is operating in compliance with United States law. Where clear evidence exists that
the subsidiary may be involved in illegal activity, the shareholdFor example, if the directors issued reports containing materially false and misleading statements and thereby rendered the stock of less value, the shareholders should be able to recover in a derivative suit the loss in value attributable to
the misleading statements. See 3A FLETCHER, supra note 9, at § 1282. Similarly,
if public knowledge of the misleading statement can be shown to have led to a
loss of business-e.g., a valuable government contract or a right to establish a
facility in a foreign country-the statute should allow shareholders remedy for
this loss. Of course, if a shareholder purchased or sold a security in reliance on
any false or misleading statement in a report available to the public, and was
damaged thereby, such purchaser or seller might also be able to obtain relief
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976),
and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978), which prohibit false and misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
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ers should have standing to bring a derivative action seeking an
investigation of the subsidiary's activities.
While the extent to which directors may rely on internal corporate reports may be unclear, we believe that neither directors nor
management should be able to prevail because they allege that
foreign law prevents them from investigating or obtaining information about the activities of a subsidiary alleged to be violating
United States law. To recognize such a defense undermines longestablished corporate law principles and, with respect to the
Rhodesian or South African sanctions, the expressed foreign policy of the United States.
Where managers of either the subsidiary or its parent corporation have breached their fiduciary duties, it does not appear that
under common law a board of directors may be held personally
liable, unless the corporation has suffered resulting loss. Relying
upon general equity principles and arguing that there is no other
adequate remedy, shareholders may, however, be able to obtain a
mandatory injunction to require directors to investigate the business activities of the subsidiary in question.
In order to enforce foreign trade restrictions and provide shareholders with a clear legal remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty, a
new federal statute should be enacted which imposes penalties on
United States corporations for failure to submit regular and accurate reports on the activities of their subsidiaries in countries
such as South Africa. This statute should also authorize the corporation to recover from its directors penalties or other damages
assessed against the corporation as a result of the directors' negligent or intentional failure to mandate complete investigations
and adequate reports of certain subsidiaries' activities. By taking
such steps, the Congress could create a set of prohibitions and
enforcement procedures which would limit drastically the opportunities available to United States companies to foster foreign
government policies clearly violative of United States law.

